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THE RETIREMENT-PLAN EXEMPTION IN THE AGE DISCRIMINA-




The concept of mandatory retirement based on age is increasingly
being challenged.' The deleterious economic, social, and psychological
effects of mandatory retirement are well-documented. 2 Nevertheless, the
societal trend is toward the imposition of compulsory retirement not only at
the traditional retirement age of sixty-five, but even earlier. 3 Indeed, retire-
ment plans encompassing as many as seventeen percent of all covered
employees contain provisions permitting forced retirement prior to age
sixty-five.4
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19675 was enacted
* Professor of Law, lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law; J.D., Yale University.
** Third-year law student, lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2588 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (this bill as well as a number of others
have been introduced to delete the present upper age limit of 65 from the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), making its antidiscrimi-
nation prohibitions applicable to those 65 and over); 113 CONG. REC. 51256-57 (1967) (remarks
of Sen. Young); M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 232-43 (1964); J. PECHMAN,
H. AARON & M. TAUSSIG, SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM 143-48, 227 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES]; Note, Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311
(1974).
In part, the rising median age of Americans and a projected drop in the ratio of workers to
retirees are motivating such questioning of mandatory retirement. See, e.g., Population Trends
Transforming U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Bixby, Retirement Patterns in
the United States, Soc. SEC. BULL. 3, 6 (Aug. 1976); The Graying of America, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 28, 1977, at 50-51.
2. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1976),
where the Court makes a statement to this effect. Justice Marshall's dissent discussed the
harmful effects of mandatory retirement. 427 U.S. at 323-24. See also BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1721, THE EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS OF OLDER
WORKERS (1971) [hereinafter cited as BULL. No. 1721].
3. SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 6; SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON
AGING, ECONOMICS OF AGING: TOWARD A FULL SHARE IN ABUNDANCE, S. REP. No. 91-1548,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 15 (1970); Age Discrimination in Employment, Hearings on Age
Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1967) (statement of Norman Sprague, National Council on the
Aging) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings].
4. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967: REPORT
COVERING ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ACT DURING 1973, at 28-29 (1974). The court in McMann v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977),
estimated the total number of workers involved in such plans to be more than 11 million, but
this figure seems high based on the statistics cited in the Department of Labor's 1974 report.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter cited as the ADEA or the
Act].
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because Congress was concerned about the grim employment situation faced
by older workers due to age discrimination.6 Congressional findings under-
scoring the purpose of the ADEA delineate the following basic problem
areas: older workers are disadvantaged in retaining and regaining employ-
ment; the setting of arbitarary age limits regardless of ability has become
commonplace; and the incidence of long-term unemployment is dispropor-
tionately high for older workers, with a deterioration in skill, morale, and
employer acceptability accompanying such unemployment. 7 Thus, the pur-
pose of the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment.' '8
Employees covered by the ADEA are those between ages forty and
sixty-five.9 It is unlawful for employers to discriminate against persons in
this protected age group on the basis of age in matters of hiring, discharge,
and the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.'°
Several statutory defenses are allowed an employer. One is for bona
fide occupational qualifications or for differentiations based "on reasonable
factors other than age."" Another is to permit the discharge or discipline of
an employee for just cause.' 2 Finally, there is the defense of the exemption
for bona fide retirement plans. Section 623(f)(2) of the ADEA states that it
shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency or labor organi-
zation
to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or
6. President Johnson's January 23, 1967, message on older Americans, recommending
the ADEA, stated:
Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves
jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. Despite our present low rate of
unemployment, there has been a persistent average of 850,000 people age 45 and over
who find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. Today more
than three-quarters of the billion dollars in unemployment insurance is paid each year
to workers who are 45 and over. They comprise 27 percent of all the unemployed, and
40 percent of the long-term unemployed.
H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in [1967] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2213, 2214.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 62 1(a) (1970).
8. Id. § 62 1(b).
9. Id. § 631.
10. Id. § 623(a)(1). Employers are defined as those engaged in interstate commerce with 20
or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). The prohibitions of the Act also
apply to labor unions and employment agencies. Id. §§ 623(b), 623(c).
11. Id. § 623(f)(1). "Reasonable factors other than age" have been deemed applicable to
situations where, for example, an employer involuntarily retires older workers during a period
of economic retrenchment, but chooses the employees to be terminated in a nondiscriminatory
manner. Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970), exemplifies this
application. The employer there was able to show that ability rather than age was the determin-
ing factor in selecting the employees for retirement. See also Price v. Maryland Cas Co., 391 F.
Supp. 613 (D.C. Miss. 1975); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1970).
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 599
insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall
excuse the failure to hire any individual .... 13
There has not been an abundance of litigation focusing on the retire-
ment-plan exemption of section 623(f)(2). Nonetheless, it is clear that
absent such exemption, the forced retirement of an employee under age
sixty-five, based on age, would be unlawful even if done pursuant to a
retirement plan. 4 Of course, the involuntary retirement of a protected
employee who is not covered by a retirement plan would be violative of the
ADEA when done solely for age.'
5
Whether the ADEA precludes compulsory retirement based on age of
employees under age sixty-five pursuant to a retirement plan will be ex-
amined in this article. This issue is currently before the United States
Supreme Court. 16 Within the last year, two circuit courts of appeals have
construed the section 623(f)(2) exemption, each reaching an opposite con-
clusion. In McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc. ,17 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit decided that such involuntary retirement of employees
based only on the criterion of age was not within the exemption and thus was
unlawful under the ADEA. 18 The McMann court held that the purpose of
the exemption was to protect older employees from refusals to hire them,
not to permit compulsory retirement based on age solely because a plan
specifies retirement at a pre-sixty-five age.19 The Court of Appeals for the
13. Id. § 623(f)(2). This section is also commonly referred to as 4(f)(2), its designation
before codification.
14. This would obviously be age-based discrimination and violate, for example, the
prohibitions of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
15. Hodgson v. American Hardward Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
Hodgson held that an employer could not involuntarily retire a nonparticipant in a pension plan
simply because the company's pension plan and general policy called for mandatory retirement
at age 62. The Hodgson court gave weight to the interpretative guidelines of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(b) (1976), which state that the retirement-plan exemption
does not apply to employees who are nonparticipants in the plan. In contrast, the guidelines in
29 C.F.R. § 860.1 10(a) (1976) declare that the Act authorizes involuntary retirement pursuant to
a bona fide plan that otherwise meets the requirements of the exemption.
16. McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S.
Ct. 1098 (1977). The ADEA would not preclude such forced retirement for employees age 65
and over because such employees are not protected by the Act.
17. Id.
18. The McMann issue is to be distinguished from the constitutional issue presented in
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In Murgia the Court rejected
a challenge on equal protection grounds to Massachusetts' policy of mandatorily retiring state
troopers at age 50, declining to declare age a suspect classification or government employment a
fundamental interest. The Court refused to subject the state policy to strict scrutiny. Accord-
ingly, a public employer's compulsory retirement policies will presumably be insulated from
constitutional challenge provided they bear a rational relationship to the employment interest
being served. See Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
19. 542 F.2d at 221.
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Third Circuit disagreed, holding in Zinger v. Blanchette2 ° that forced
retirement of pre-sixty-five employees may be permitted by the exemption.
A third court of appeals' case, Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co. ,2I
previously stood alone as the only appellate court construing section
623(f)(2). The Fifth Circuit held in Taft that a bona fide profit-sharing plan
providing benefits upon mandatory retirement at age sixty did not violate the
ADEA. The Fifth Circuit interpreted the exemption most broadly, finding
that a plan initiated prior to the ADEA cannot be a subterfuge to evade it and
that the exemption's language was so "unambiguous" as to preclude resort
to legislative history.
22
Since legislative history is necessary to arrive at the proper statutory
construction of the retirement-plan exemption, the McMann and Zinger
opinions will be the focus of this article. Three basic issues emerge from
these two opinions: first, that of determining Congressional intent in provid-
ing the exemption; second, the meaning of the phrase, contained in the
exemption, "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act;" and third, the
significance and effect of the last clause of the exemption, providing that no
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.
THE CASES
McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Plaintiff McMann occupied a managerial position with defendant
United Air Lines. McMann elected to join United's voluntary pension plan,
which was in existence at the time he was hired in 1944. Both the applica-
tion that he signed and all relevant documents he later received specified that
"normal retirement age" for employees in his classification was sixty.
United had never retained employees in McMann's classification beyond
age sixty and McMann likewise was forced to retire upon reaching this age.
The court thereby treated the plan as one requiring retirement rather than one
permitting it at the option of the employer. 23 United offered no justification
for McMann's termination other than the plan requirement.
It was conceded that United's plan was bona fide. 24 Nevertheless, the
20. 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3711 (U.S. Apr. 7,
1977) (No. 76-1375).
21. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). Taft has been followed by a number of district courts.
See, e.g., Dunlop v. General Tel. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1211 (C.D. Cal. 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 76-2371 (9th Cir., June 25, 1976); McKinley v. Bendix Corp., 420 F. Supp. 1001
(W.D. Mo. 1976).
22. 500 F.2d at 217.
23. 542 F.2d at 219.
24. Id. All three appellate courts dealt with the term "bona fine" in the exemption as
denoting a non-fraudulent plan that exists and pays benefits. See, e.g., id; Brennan v. Taft
Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
600
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Fourth Circuit held that an employee retirement plan compelling retirement
under age sixty-five is unlawful under the ADEA absent economic or
business justification.25 Since United offered no such justification, the court
held United's plan to be a subterfuge to evade the Act's purpose, 26 therefore
outside the section 623(f)(2) exemption, and in violation of the ADEA. To
qualify for the exemption, the employer must prove that there is "some
reason other than age for a plan, or a provision of a plan, which discrimi-
nates between employees of different ages." 27
In concluding that the retirement-plan exemption was inapplicable to
McMann's retirement, the court relied on both ADEA legislative history and-
the meaning of "subterfuge" in section 623(f)(2). As to the former, the
court construed the exemption's purpose as being to encourage the employ-
ment of older workers. 28 Because the age of some potential employees
would make it economically unfeasible for them to participate in existing
retirement plans, employers would refuse to hire them. With the exemption,
however, employers would be able to hire such older workers but would not
necessarily have to assume the economic burden of including them in an
existing plan. The McMann court concluded from the legislative history
"that Congress did not intend retirement plan provisions ever to excuse the
failure to hire or the discharge of any individual, but only to permit
exclusion of some workers from the plan on the basis of age where
exclusion is justified by economic considerations . '.'.. 29
In interpreting the meaning of "subterfuge" in section 623(f)(2), the
court held that even a plan in existence before the ADEA could be a
subterfuge if it evaded the purposes of the Act. 3° Involuntary retirement of a
long-time employee, based only on age, is a form of age discrimination
contrary to the Act's stated purposes of promoting employment based on
ability rather than age and of prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination. The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, viewed McMann's termination as a subterfuge to
evade the ADEA's purposes. Also supporting the court's conclusion that a
plan initiated prior to ADEA could be deemed a subterfuge were the
House and Senate Reports on the Act, specifying that the retirement-plan
exemption was to apply to existing as well as new plans and to the
maintenance as well as to the establishment of such plans. 3'
25. 542 F.2d at 220-21.
26. Id. at 220.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 221.
29. Id. (original emphasis).
30. The court stated its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit which had held in Taft that a
plan in existence prior to the ADEA's enactment could not be a subterfuge to evade the Act. Id.
at 221-22.
31. Id. at 221.
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The McMann court further reasoned that such interpretation of "sub-
terfuge" was the only one possible in light of the proviso in section
623(f)(2) which stated "that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual." Under the proviso, an employer would be
required to hire an otherwise qualified sixty-year-old employee even if it had
a retirement plan calling for age sixty mandatory retirement. Therefore, to
read the exemption as permitting compulsory retirement at age sixty under a
retirement plan would, in conjunction with the proviso proscribing a failure
to hire, produce an absurd result: an employee retired under a plan would
have to be rehired immediately so long as he or she was properly qualified.32
Since the proviso prohibits a refusal to hire and there is no conceptual
difference between involuntary retirement and a refusal to hire, 33 the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the exemption could not logically be read to permit
such involuntary retirement.
To justify its use of the statutory defense, defendant United pointed to
the Secretary of the Department of Labor's published interpretative regula-
tions regarding the exemption, 34 which were issued shortly after the Act
became effective. According to the regulations, the ADEA authorizes in-
voluntary retirement irrespective of age pursuant to a retirement plan,
provided that such plan otherwise meets the statutory exemption require-
ments, i.e., is bona fide and not a subterfuge. However, as noted in its
amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff, the Department subsequently
concluded that this interpretation was incorrect because it was based on the
erroneous premise that certain involuntary retirement provisions in plans
could be related to costs.3" The Department's present position is basically
that mandatory retirement prior to age sixty-five is within the exemption
only if it is essential to a bona fide plan's economic survival or has some
"legitimate purpose" other than to terminate older workers. 36 The McMann
court agreed with the Department's view that a change in this matter was
justified and permissible since the regulation was, by its own terms, inter-
pretative rather than legislative.
37
32. Id. at 220.
33. Id. at 221 (.quoting Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. at
229). An early Wage-Hour opinion states that an individual compelled to retire before age 65 is
not precluded from applying for re-employment with the same employer, and that the Act
requires this employee to "be considered in the same light as any other applicant." Fair Empl.
Prac. Man. 401:5217 (Sept. 13, 1968).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1976). See note 15 supra.
35. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, United States Dep't of Labor, as Amicus Curiae, at
19-20, McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
McMann Amicus Curiae Brief I]. Contemplated revisions of the regulations will reflect the
Department's view that provisions calling for involuntary retirement prior to age 65 can never
be justified on the basis of cost to the employer. Id.
36. See Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 908 (3d Cir. 1977). See also note 54 infra for
the three criteria delineating the Department's present position.
37. 542 F.2d at 219-20 n.4. In 29 C.F.R. § 860.1 (1976), the Department states that its
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Finally, the court in McMann observed that its construction of the
exemption would not adversely affect the nation's pension plans because
any postponement of retirement generally results in cost savings to a plan.
38
According to the court, these savings result because of mortality before




Plaintiff in Zinger, a staff lawyer of the Penn Central Railroad, was
compelled to retire at the age of sixty-four pursuant to the employer's
pension policy. 4° Plaintiff challenged the policy on much the same basis as
plaintiff in McMann: although bona fide, the plan was a subterfuge and thus
not within the exemption of section 623(f)(2). 41
The Zinger court, although agreeing with the Fourth Circuit that even a
plan existing prior to the ADEA may be a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of the Act,42 came to a different conclusion. The court asserted that there
was a clear and crucial distinction between a discriminatory discharge,
prohibited by the ADEA, and retirement with a pension. An examination of
the ADEA's legislative history convinced the court that Congress chose to
legislate only with respect to discharge and not with respect to involuntary
retirement with pensions.43
The court, acknowledging that any involuntary retirement was in effect
a form of age discrimination, reasoned that the section 623(f)(2) exemption
nevertheless made such retirement lawful when it was in accordance with a
bona fide plan. 44 Similarly, the court admitted that this broad exemption
interpretation may be changed by court decisions or by its own finding, upon reexamination,
that the guidlines are incorrect. The McMann court stated that it was expressing no opinion as
to whether defendant United could use the changed interpretation as a defense under 29 U.S.C.
§§ 259, 626(e) (1970). Section 259 excuses an employer from monetary liability if "the act...
complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administra-
tive regulation . . . or interpretation, of the agency . . . ." Administrative regulations of both
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the ADEA are issued by the Department of Labor.
38. 542 F.2d at 222.
39. Id. at 222 n.8 (citing M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 226 (1964)).
40. The company's "Policy of Interim Pensions," adopted prior to the ADEA, stated that
the company could elect to retire persons between the ages of 60 and 65 and that such
employees would receive interim pensions until age 65, when payments would begin under the
Railroad Retirement Act. 542 F.2d at 902.
41. Plaintiff's claim that his premature retirement violated an employee protective order
issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission is beyond the scope of this article. See id. at
903-04.
42. 549 F.2d at 904-05. But see Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1974); de Loraine v. Meba Pension Trust, 499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009
(1974); Steiner v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 377 F. Supp. 945 (1974),
aff'd mer., No. 74-2604 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1975) (unpublished decision); Dunlop v. General Tel.
Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1211 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
43. 549 F.2d at 905.
44. Id. at 910.
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"may be inconsistent with the prohibition against discrimination in hiring
and produce the anomaly that a person who has been involuntarily retired by
one company before age sixty-five may not be discriminated against in
applying for employment at another company."
45
The essential Zinger underpinning was that the retirement plan exemp-
tion was a broad one and that a bona fide plan compelling retirement prior to
age sixty-five was unlawful only when it was a subterfuge. Further implied
in the court's reasoning was that a plan granting substantial benefits cannot
be a subterfuge,4 6 the court stating that plaintiff's pension was "not un-
reasonable-certainly not so small as to brand the plan a subterfuge."
4 7
Similarly, the court noted that "retirement on an adequate pension was
generally regarded with favor."48
The Zinger court relied on several factors to support its view that the
legislative history of the ADEA distinguished between discharge and retire-
ment with a pension. Principally, the court interpreted statements made
during the Senate subcommittee hearings by Senator Javits, the sponsor of
the amendment that ultimately led to section 623(f)(2), and statements made
during the subcommittee hearings by Secretary of Labor Wirtz. 49 The court
also relied on the fact that the legislative director of the AFL-CIO had tried,
without success, to strike the exemption.
50
The court was impressed with two further factors: (1) the similarity of
the final wording of section 623(f)(2) to that of New York and several other
state statutes; and (2) the fact that these state statutes and New York's
explanatory notes were introduced in the record at the Senate subcommittee
hearings. 5' The Zinger court noted that New York's explantory notes stated
that a retirement plan providing for compulsory retirement was lawful when
it pre-dated the enactment of the statute.
52
Finally, the court disregarded the revised position of the Department of
45. Id. at 909.
46. A federal district court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court arrived at similar definitions
of subterfuge, though each used reasoning differing both from each other's and from that of the
Zinger court. The court in Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976),
straining to give effect to the Department of Labor's original guidelines, could find no other
meaning of subterfuge that would make sense of the exemption and relate it to the ADEA's
prohibitions against age discrimination. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Walker
Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965), was based on the
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, which made it unlawful "to deprive the victims of earnings
which are necessary to maintain a just and decent standard of living." The court judged that the
pension benefits were sufficient to prevent such deprivation. Id. at 686, 135 N.W.2d at 316.
47. 549 F.2d at 909.
48. Id. at 905.
49. Id. at 906-07.
50. Id. at 907 & 907 n. 10. See also note 88 infra.
51. Id. at 907.
52. Id. See also text accompanying note 83 infra.
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Labor, 53 giving effect instead to the Department's initial interpretation
contemporaneous with the ADEA's effective date, which distinguished
between retirement with and without a pension.54 The Third Circuit be-
lieved the Department's present position incorrect because it ignored the
legislative history and the distinction between discharge and retirement with
a pension.
55
In sum, Zinger held that Congress had clearly exempted bona fide
plans that were not a subterfuge from the ADEA's prohibitions and that it
was the court's duty to uphold such legislative decision-making. The court
followed what it perceived as the letter of the law, despite resulting inconsis-
tencies with other elements of the statute and despite contrary policy con-
siderations, such as the increasing age of the population and the stability of
the social security system. Such considerations, the court stated, should be
left to Congressional consideration.
56
Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.
Taft57 involved the issue of whether a profit-sharing plan which called
for normal retirement at the age of sixty fell within the section 623(f)(2)
53. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a)(b) (1976). The Zinger court examined the Department of
Labor's current position, which states that mandatory retirement prior to age 65 is lawful only if
the mandatory retirement provision meets three criteria:
(1) is contained in a bona fide pension or retirement plan, (2) is required by the terms
of the plan and is not optional and (3) is essential to the plan's economic survival or to
some other legitimate purpose-i.e., is not in the plan for the sole urpose (sic) of
moving out older workers ....
549 F.2d at 908. It found nothing in the written statute limiting the exemption to these criteria.
Id. at 909.
55. 549 F.2d at 908. In support of its position, the Zinger court cited the Supreme Court's
discounting of a changed EEOC guideline in General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
In fact, the Department of Labor's position is obviously a secondary issue. If the Court
finds that the ADEA's legislative history supports the Department's present interpretation, it
will accord full weight to this interpretation. Conversely, if it finds that the Department's first
interpretation was correct because of the legislative history, it undoubtedly will reverse the
Fourth Circuit in McMann. Two minor points about the Department's position, however,
should be made. The Court has said that "the considerable discretion possessed by the
Secretary [of Labor] as the one responsible for the actual administration of the Act should not
be understressed." Idaho Sheet Metal Workers, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 205 (1966). How
the Court views this discretion in McMann will depend on whether it finds that Congress
intended the exemption to be narrowly construed, permitting involuntary retirement with a
pension only when a cost justification exists in the plan itself. Second, the Court made explicit
in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), that a court may properly use administra-
tive rulings and interpretations for guidance but that such interpretations are not controlling.
The following criteria were enunciated in Skidmore as to the weight to be given such adminis-
trative judgments: thoroughness, validity of reasoning, and consistency with earlier and later
interpretations. Id. The Department of Labor now says that its contemporaneous interpretation
was incorrect because it was based on a fallacious assumption concerning cost factors in
pension plans. If one accepts this premise and that it is more in accord with congressional
intention, then two of the Skidmore criteria are fulfilled, i.e., thoroughness and valid reasoning.
The third criterion is not satisfied, however, because it is inconsistent with the ruling issued
contemporaneously with the ADEA's enactment.
56. 549 F.2d at 909.
57. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). The Secretary of Labor was the appellant in this case.
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exemption. The employee there unsuccessfully offered to waive his plan
benefits in order to secure a later retirement and also unsuccessfully applied
for rehiring just before his retirement.
The Fifth Circuit held that a profit-sharing plan fell within the section
623(f)(2) exemption; 58 that a plan established prior to the Act could not be a
subterfuge; 59 and that an employer was not obliged to rehire an otherwise
qualified employee recently retired under that employer's mandatory retire-
ment system. 60 As to the last point, the court, noting the proviso in the
exemption that no plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual,
reasoned that "[ilf retired employees must be rehired immediately, the right
to insist on compliance with a plan is an illusion."61
The Fifth Circuit was the only appellate court to find that the section
623(f)(2) exemption was clear and unambiguous in allowing mandatory
retirement of plan employees prior to age sixty-five and declared that
legislative history could not be used to override such unambiguous lan-
guage. 62 Thus the court was unpersuaded by legislative-history indications
that the exemption had been intended to protect plans which would, without
the exemption, become too costly for an employer to continue. 63 The court
further held that a case-by-case judicial scrutiny of the costliness of retire-
ment plans presented insuperable practical difficulties.
64
As the Fourth and Third Circuits pointed out, Taft's finding that a plan
initiated prior to the ADEA could not be a subterfuge to evade the Act, and
thus was always within the exemption, was not supported by legislative
history. 65 Furthermore, Taft's conclusion that the exemption's language
was so clear and unambiguous as to preclude resort to legislative history was
clearly erroneous. Significantly, Judge Tuttle, dissenting in Taft,66 and the
McMann and Zinger courts did not perceive the statutory language as being
plain and lucid. Moreover, the assertion that resort to legislative history was
58. Id. at 215. Since no shares could accrue to any employee over age 60 under the Taft
plan, the company would save money by retaining such employees.
59. Id. See text accompanying notes 30-31 and 42 supra for the opposing views of the
McMann and Zinger courts.
60. 500 F.2d at 218.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 217.
63. Id. at 216.
64. Id. at 217.
65. See text accompanying notes 31 and 42 supra.
66. In a forceful dissent, Judge Tuttle said that "[t]he language of the statute creating an
exemption, if, in fact, it really does create an exemption, is not artfully worded." 500 F.2d at
220. He also stated that the statutory language only calls for an employer "to observe" the
terms of a plan and that this is not synonymous with permitting an employer to "enforce" or
"carry out" the terms. Moreover, the narrow construction rule is appropriate in dealing with an
exemption to a statute and, according to Judge Tuttle, a party relying on an exemption has the
burden of establishing that it clearly falls within the "terms and spirit" of the Act. Id. (quoting
Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
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excluded by the statutory language has been contradicted in other cases.6 7
Because of Taft's lack of legislative-history analysis, the remainder of this
article will concentrate exclusively on the McMann and Zinger opinions.
ANALYZING THE CASES
Legislative History
The House and Senate Reports on the ADEA, basically identical, and
the legislative history clearly support the McMann court's conclusion re-
garding the section 623(f)(2) exemption. These reports state: "This exemp-
tion serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the bill-hiring of older
workers-by permitting employment without necessarily including such
workers in employee benefit plans."
68
Senator Javits, sponsor of the amended version of the exemption,
reiterated this explanation in his individual views which were included in the
Senate Report. He stated there that the absence of the provision exempting
the observance of bona fide plans "might actually have discouraged em-
ployers from hiring older workers because of the increased costs involved in
providing certain types of benefits to them." 69
During the Senate floor ADEA debates, both Senators Yarborough, the
principal sponsor of the bill, and Javits underscored the retirement-plan
exemption's meaning. Senator Javits said:
The amendment relating to . . . employee benefit plans is par-
ticularly significant: because of it an employer will not be com-
pelled to afford older workers exactly the same pension, retire-
ment, or insurance benefits as younger workers and thus employers
will not, because of the often extremely high cost of providing
certain types of benefits to older workers, actually be discouraged
from hiring older workers. At the same time, it should be clear that
this amendment only relates to the observance of bona fide plans.
No such plan will help an employer if it is adopted merely as a
subterfuge for discriminating against older workers.
70
Senator Javits repeated this interpretation during the debates in response to
pointed questioning, affirming this construction of the exemption. 71
67. The Supreme Court has said that "words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason
there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to legislative history no matter how 'clear the
words may appear to be on superficial examination.' " Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317
U.S. 476, 479 (1943). See also McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir.
1976). For a thorough critique of Taft, see Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Statutory Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 227, 242-46 (1974).
68. H.R, REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1967] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2213, 2217 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 8051; S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 723].
69. S. REP. No. 723, supra note 68, at 14 (individual views of Sen. Javits).
70. 113 CONG. REC. 31254-55 (1967).
71. Id. at 31255.
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Senator Yarborough explicitly agreed with Senator Javits' construction
and expanded upon it when he said that:
[I]t means that a man who would not have been employed except
for this law does not have to receive the benefits of the plan. Say
an applicant for employment is 55, comes in and seeks employ-
ment, and the company has bargained for a plan with its labor
union that provides that certain moneys will be put up for a
pension plan for anyone who worked for the employer for 20 years
so that a 55-year-old employee would not be employed past 10
years. This means he cannot be denied employment because he is
55, but he will not be able to participate in that pension plan
because unlike a man hired at 44, he has no chance to earn 20
years retirement . . . . This [provision] will not deny any indi-
vidual employment or prospective employment but will limit his
rights to obtain full consideration in the pension, retirement or
insurance plan.72
During the House floor debates, Representative Smith observed that it
was important to pay heed to the stated purpose of the exemption, as it had
been explained in the House Report, because the language of the exemption
was otherwise unclear." Representative Daniels noted that the exemption
"would permit the hiring of older workers without requiring that they
necessarily be included in all employee benefit plans. This provision is
designed to maximize employment possibilities without working an undue
hardship on employers in providing special and costly benefits."
74
Significantly, the original wording of the exemption, as drafted by the
administration prior to its Committee revisions, provided:
Sec. 4(f). It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employ-
ment agency or labor organization--(2) to separate involuntarily
an employee under a retirement policy or system where such
policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of the Act. 7
This language would clearly have permitted the forced early retirement of
persons under age sixty-five pursuant to retirement plans. Yet this plain
language was deleted, indicating it was not Congress' intent to permit this.
76
72. Id. Senatorial concern was also expressed during the floor debates about both the
plight of those over 65 and those airline stewardesses forced to retire in their thirties, neither
group being covered by the ADEA. Id. at 31256-57 (remarks of Sen. Young); id. at 31253
(remarks of Sen. Yarborough). No concern was expressed, however, that the retirement-plan
exemption contained a broad loophole regarding involuntary retirement. Perhaps this was
because no such concern existed given the committee report and the statements of Senators
Javits and Yarborough.
73. Id. at 34745.
74. Id. at 34746.
75. Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., I st Sess. 3
(1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings].
76. The Zinger court reached a different conclusion regarding the language change,
viewing the difference as unimportant. The court found support for this in the fact that
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
In arguing that the administration's version should be amended,
Senator Javits described his suggested amendment as having the purpose of
facilitating hiring. 77 Senator Smathers betrayed a similar concern that the
bill would otherwise make it difficult for older workers to get jobs because
they would have to be given the same pension rights as younger workers.
78
Numerous spokesmen for business testified that existing plans and other
fringe benefits would be disrupted under the contemplated bill.79
This concern principally focused on problems of increased costs as well
as the possible harmful effect on the hiring of older workers. Pension plans
generally excluded workers hired at ages like fifty-five and sixty and health
and insurance schemes often differentiated on the basis of age. Thus, absent
the exemption, such plans would have violated the bill's prohibitions against
discriminating as to the terms and conditions of employment and would
have caused increased costs on the part of employers attempting to avoid
such violations.
In the hearings before the House subcommittee, Secretary of Labor
Wirtz elaborated on the bill's effect on pension plans in response to ques-
tioning by Representative Burton. Secretary Wirtz explained that the bill
"specifically recognizes those plans that are worked out for rational rea-
sons, so long as they do not result in differentiation just on the basis of age
where there is not justification in fact."' 0
While legislative history thus squarely supports the McMann conclu-
sion, the only real backing of the Zinger holding in the floor debates is
Senator Yarborough's introduction into the Congressional Record of the fact
that New York and fourteen other states had an exemption for retirement
plans similar in wording to the ADEA exemption. 8' The Zinger court put a
great deal of emphasis on the introduction of the New York statute and
explantory notes during the Senate subcommittee hearings, correctly finding
that the New York interpretative ruling states that an employee may be
involuntarily retired pursuant to a pension plan formulated before the effec-
tive date of New York's statute. 82 However, the Zinger court overlooked
the fact that the same explantory notes specify that compulsory retirement
prior to age sixty-five pursuant to a plan enacted after the statute's effective
date will occasion the following procedure: The employer will have "to
Secretary Wirtz had testified that the change did not go to "substance" but instead involved
"matters going to clarification." 549 F.2d at 907.
77. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 3.
78. Id. at 29.
79. See. e.g.. id. at 112 (remarks of Mr. Obadal, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); 1967
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 62-63 (remarks of Mr. Pestillo, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
80. 1967 Housing Hearings, supra note 3, at 14.
81. 113 CONG. REC. 31253 (1967).
82. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 251.
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justify the reasonableness of the specified compulsory retirement age in
relation to (1) the employer's overall employment policy and (2) the particu-
lar occupational category to which it applies.'" 83
Since the Zinger court itself concluded that the ADEA does not, unlike
New York, treat plans differently that were created before its enactment
from those created thereafter, the example of the New York statute as
sustaining the Zinger court's conclusion is weakened. Furthermore, Repre-
sentative Matsunaga noted during the ADEA floor discussion that most state
laws were not very effective. 84 A Senate committee recently characterized
such state laws as "more loophole than law," 85 further showing that
excessive court reliance on state experiences is unwarranted.
The Zinger court's conclusion receives a modicum of further support
from certain rather casual statements made by Senator Javits and Secretary
Wirtz during the hearings. For example, when Senator Javits introduced to
the subcommittee his idea of amending the administration's version of the
retirement-plan exemption, he recommended "that a fairly broad exemption
be provided for bona fide retirement . . . systems which will facilitate
hiring rather than deter it .... "86 Secretary Wirtz also referred to the
various ADEA exemptions as being "broad, ' 87 and testified at the Senate
hearing that "[i]t would be my judgment . . . that the effect of the
provision . . . is to protect the application of almost all plans.which I know
anything about . . . . It is intended to protect retirement plans." 88
83. Id. at 251-52. There have been no recorded judicial constructions of the New York
statute's retirement-plan exemption.
84. 113 CONG. REC. 34743 (1967).
85. SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1972 AND JANUARY-
MARCH 1973, S. REP. No. 93-147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1973).
86. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 28.
87. Id. at 39.
88. Id. at 53. The legislative director of the AFL-CIO. Mr. Biemiller, testified during the
Senate hearings that the administration bill would
permit involuntary retirement of employees under 65. We do not believe that the
safeguard which this provision purports to contain restricting this possibility to cases
where it is done 'under a retirement policy or system where such policy or system is
not merely a subterfuge . . .' is adequate to prevent serious abuse of this provision.
Id. at 98. Similar views were expressed by another AFL-CIO representative, see 1967House
Hearings, supra note 3, at 411, 418. The Zinger court was impressed by the fact that the AFL-
CIO representatives had unsuccessfully attempted to have the provision allowing for separation
under retirement policies stricken. 549 F.2d at 907. But it is clear from Mr. Biemiller's language
that he was referring to the provision in the administration's bill, which, as previously ex-
plained, underwent considerable revision. Mr. Biemiller's comment also may be construed as
the extreme position of an advocate. When he spoke of serious abuse being possible, he
understandably could have been concerned that the provision, as then written, would lead to
misapplication and misunderstanding. The Zinger court also pointed to the fact that the ADEA
requires the Secretary of Labor to make a study of "institutional and other arrangements giving
rise to involuntary retirements" and to report his findings and recommendations to Congress.
29 U.S.C. § 624 (1970). This study is yet to be completed. The Third Circuit saw this study as
evidence that, despite congressional awareness of the retirement problem, it had chosen to
await further information before legislating on the subject of age requirements in retirement
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However, such cavalier and obviously vague comments cannot over-
come the strong historical evidence that the section 623(f)(2) exemption was
intended to help older employees obtain employment, not hurt them by
permitting them to be terminated. The exemption was meant to enable
employers to hire older employees without encountering the staggering
economic consequences that would have ensued if such workers were
required to be covered by existing retirement plans. Without the exemption,
employers may well have been disinclined to hire older workers-law or no
law-or to retain their retirement plans. With the exemption, employers
were able to do both, for the ultimate benefit of older employees.
At the risk of being trite, it might be said that which was enacted as a
shield should not be used as a sword. Section 623(f)(2) was enacted to
protect older employees against refusals to hire them. It should not be used
to permit such employees to be compulsorarily terminated based on age.
While the McMann decision is in accord with the exemption's purpose, the
Zinger holding is a serious subversion of it.
Statutory Construction
One starts with the obvious premise that the ADEA is a remedial
statute. As such, it should be liberally construed89 in order to give effect to
the underlying purposes which Congress sought to achieve by the legisla-
tion. 9° As the Supreme Court has previously declared, any exemption from
such remedial legislation must be narrowly construed. 91 "The exemption
• . .was not intended to swallow the rule."
92
The McMann decision is in accord with these established rules of
statutory construction, whereas the Zinger holding is not. The Zinger
court's broad construction of the retirement-plan exemption-an adherence
by the court to what it thought to be the letter of the law-is inimical to these
basic rules of statutory construction. It narrows the remedial portion of the
law and broadens the exemption.
The spirit of the ADEA emanates clearly from the declaration of
Congressional findings and purpose in the opening section of the Act. It
seeks "to promote the employment of older workers based on their ability
plans. 549 F.2d at 909. There is no further legislative-history connecting this provision with the
section 623(f)(2) exemption. The committee reports, for example, make no additional comment
about the study; in contrast, they specifically commented on the purpose of the exemption.
Furthermore, the use of education and research programs by the Secretary of Labor to
implement the Act's purpose is an integral part of the ADEA and is enunciated in section 622.
29 U.S.C. § 622 (1970). Thus, whether Congress intended a precise relationship between the
study on involuntary retirement and the retirement-plan exemption is unclear.
89. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1967).
90. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974).
91. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). See also note 66 supra.
92. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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rather than age; [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employ-
ment." 93 The spirit of the ADEA is also reflected in such Congressional
findings as that older workers are disadvantaged in retaining employment
and are subject to discrimiriation in "the setting of arbitrary age limits
regardless of potential for job performance." 94 It is the policy of the ADEA
to eradicate such practices. The Zinger decision simply does not give effect
to these aims.
Neither does the Zinger court's construction comport with the purpose
of the exemption, which was enunciated in the House and Senate Reports
95
and in the Senate and House floor debates on the bill,96 and was also evident
in much of the testimony during the subcommittee hearings. This purpose
was primarily to facilitate the hiring of older workers and, secondarily, to
prevent the discontinuance of existing pension plans by protecting employ-
ers from suffering additional costs in order for their plans to be lawful under
the Act. The exemption was not meant to serve as a broad vehicle for
discriminatory termination on the basis of age.
The narrow reading of the exemption by the McMann court does, on
the other hand, give liberal effect to the underlying policies of the ADEA. It
does promote employment of older workers; it does discourage arbitrary age
discrimination; and it does deter arbitrary age limitations.
Of course, McMann protects the employer if it can show cost justifica-
tion for the early retirement policy. 9
7 However, ordinarily none will exist. 9
8
This is because the employer can observe the terms of a bona fide plan, by
ceasing to credit further pension benefits to those who have reached the
specified retirement age, even though it cannot mandatorily retire older
employees under age sixty-five. Thus, there is no further cost incurred.
Involuntary Retirement Versus Discharge-An Invalid Distinction
Aside from its reliance on legislative history, the basis of the Zinger
court's construal was its emphasis on the clear distinctions between retire-
ment with a pension and discharge and between involuntary retirement with
93. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
94. Id. § 621(a)(2).
95. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra. It is an established rule of statutory
interpretation that committee reports have great import for such construction. I A. SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTES, AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 14, at 298 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972).
96. See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra and notes 122-23 infra.
99. This construction not only gives effect to the purposes of the ADEA and of the
exemption but interprets the last clause of section 623(f)(2)-that a plan shall not excuse the
failure to hire any individual-in such a way that its effect is neither absurd nor anomalous. See
text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
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and without a pension.100 Several factors militate against the validity of
these distinctions.
The difference between discharge and retirement is not generally re-
cognized as being viable in the industrial relations field. For example, labor
arbitrators, who constantly deal with such problems, generally hold that
forced retirement is not distinguishable from discharge and is thus generally
found to be an infringement of the security and seniority provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.' 0 ' Arbitrators have also constantly dis-
agreed with the argument that compulsory retirement with a pension is a
just-cause discharge. 10 2 As one arbitrator noted, while compulsory retire-
ment is not exactly the same as discharge, it has the same legal and practical.
effect. 103
It is generally recognized in our society that forced retirement frequent-
ly has both injurious psychological as well as financial consequences. 104 The
ADEA was intended to assuage not only economic suffering but also the
psychological suffering endured by older workers because of employment
discrimination.' 05 For example, during the ADEA floor debates Representa-
tive Eilberg pointed to the human suffering flowing from discriminatory
employment practices and noted that self-esteem and self-satisfaction are
significant appurtenances of employment in the United States.' 0 6 A recent
ADEA case concerning forced retirement spoke of the "cruel blow to the
dignity and self-respect" of a person who devoted a lifetime to productive
work. 0 7 Thus, even if retirement with a pension could cushion the financial
consequences of retirement, it cannot assuage the mental anguish of a
person being denied the opportunity to continue fruitful employment simply
because he or she has reached a certain age.
100. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
101. Armour Agricultural Chem. Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 4386, 47 Lab. Arb. 513,
516 (1966) (Larkin, Arb.); accord, Herman Nelson v. Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local
2045, 50 Lab. Arb. 1177 (1968) (Sembower, Arb.). As to judicial construction of discharge-
retirement distinctions, see United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997, 1003
(7th Cir. 1952); United States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 950 (1956).
102. See, e.g., the arbitration cases cited in note 101 supra. See also Beatrice Foods v.
Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local 1127, 55 Lab. Arb. 933, 942 (1970) (Young, Arb.).
103. Honeggers' & Co., Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 90, 56 Lab. Arb.
251, 253 (1971) (Anrod, Arb.). This arbitrator also found that "a normal retirement age"
specified in an agreement (the situation in McMann) is not the same as a compulsory retirement
age; accord, Vulcan Radiator Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Local 354, Dist. 26, 50
Lab. Arb. 90, 94 (1967) (Shipman, Arb.).
104. See note 2 supra.
105. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D. N.J. 1975), vacated
and remanded in light of Zinger, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Paragon Employment
Agency, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd mem., 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974).
106. 113 CONG. REC. 34745 (remarks of Rep. Eilberg); see also id. at 31256 (remarks of
Sen. Young); id. at 34751-52 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer).
107. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D. N.J. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
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Additionally, the Zinger court's holding does not harmonize with the
last clause of the exemption, that a plan cannot excuse the failure to hire. 1
08
A refusal to hire, the forced retirement of a plan member under the age of
sixty-five, and discharge all involve the same basic element: a refusal to
employ.'I° If a plan cannot lawfully excuse the failure to hire, logically it
should not lawfully excuse the failure to retain or rehire.
I 10
Policy Considerations
The policy behind the ADEA is, in a nutshell, to discourage employ-
ment discrimination against older persons. McMann fosters such a policy.
Zinger does not.
The usual consequence of retirement is a sharp decline in income,
il l
solely because of age, precisely what the ADEA is designed to deter. Even a
combination of pension benefits and social security is often insufficient to
permit older workers "to maintain the standard of living they desire."
112
This problem is obviously exacerbated when no social security benefits are
available. 113
Exact financial data on the average or median pension benefit paid to
retirees is not readily accessible. However, those figures that are available
108. Congress expressed much concern over the fact that once an older worker was
terminated, he or she faced much greater difficulty in obtaining new employment than did a
younger worker. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 31746 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Dent). During the
ADEA hearings, Secretary Wirtz testified that about half of the job openings in the United
States were closed to applicants over the age of 55. 1967 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 9. It
does not seem unduly speculative to infer that Congress, by adding the proviso to section
623(f)(2), also intended to bar the non-retention of qualified employees who were plan members
unless some essential cost justification was at stake. See McMann Amicus Curiae Brief I, supra
note 35, at 16. That older workers cost more than younger workers to employ would not by
itself be a valid excuse for differentiation under the ADEA. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1976);
Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 281, 325 (1975).
109. See text accompanying note 33 supra; McMann Amicus Curiae Brief I, supra note 35,
at 16.
110. See Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and
Recent Developments, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 227, 246 (1974).
111. SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 25.
112. BULL. No. 1721, supra note 2, at 2.
113. Such is the case with plaintiff McMann, forced into retirement at age 60. The fact that
Congress selected an upper-age limit of 65 for ADEA coverage is notable. Congress was
certainly aware that only at this age may retirees receive full Social Security benefits. See, e.g.,
113 CONG. REc. 31253 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough). In fact, the overwhelming majority
of retirement plans in the United States do provide for retirement at age 65. FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVES RESEARCH FOUNDATION, FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 74 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS]. In establishing this
retirement age and in computing their own plan benefits, employers rely on the fact that their
employees will receive a significant portion of their retirement income from Social Security.
For example, according to one study of selected private plans, a worker who earned $9,000 in
1974 and retired in 1975, after 30 years, received a median plan benefit equal to 29% of his last
year's pay and an additional 39% from Social Security. BANKERS TRUST Co., N.Y., STUDY OF
CORPORATE PENSION PLANS 29 (1975).
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do not paint an attractive picture. A 1968 study showed that most retirees in
1967 received less than $1,000 a year from private plans and that half of the
couples received benefits of less than $970 a year." 4 A 1971 Senate study of
764 private plans divulged a median monthly benefit of $99 for those
retiring at a normal age. 115 The federal government more recently estimated
annual benefit outlays by private industry of $2,074 for each beneficiary,
116
cautioning, however, that this average is imprecise because it overrepresents
the average amount by including lump-sum payments." 7 Also, of course, an
average pension benefit inaccurately reflects what most people receive
because of variables involved such as past earnings."
18
These benefit levels do not support a policy favoring retirement with
pensions. Other considerations bear on this. First, private pension programs
often stipulate that retirees will forfeit benefits if they work for firms that
compete with their previous employer, 119 the only areas where their skills
are marketable. Second, even if such workers are sixty-two years of age and
can claim early social security benefits, they must then take an actuarial
reduction of twenty percent 120 and are ineligible for other old-age benefits,
such as medicare. 121
Furthermore, the McMann court's conclusion that postponing retire-
ment to age sixty-five ordinarily results in cost savings-not cost-for the
employer rests on firm footing. A 1975 research report on private pension
plans states that lowering the retirement age of sixty-five increases plan
costs. 122 The report continues: "Although the employee will accrue lesser
benefits as of the earlier retirement age he will be receiving benefits earlier
and for a longer period.' 123 Not only do pension costs increase with early
retirement but plans typically have a built-in actuarial reduction in employee
benefits for each year that the employee's retirement precedes the normal
retirement age. 124 The application of the McMann holding will thus have a
salutory effect both on employer pension costs and on the benefits for those
employees who consequently will be able to avoid the hazard of premature
retirement.
114. R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION 79 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
NADER & BLACKWELL].
115. Id. at 79-80.
116. Skolnick, Private Pension Plans 1950-74, Soc. SEC. BULL. 3, 5 (June 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Skolnick]. The average Social Security benefit as of October 1976 was $223.97 per
month. Social Security in Review: Program Operations, Soc. SEC. BULL. 1 (Feb. 1977).
117. Skolnick, supra note 116, at 5 n.2.
118. NADER & BLACKWELL, supra note 114, at 80.
119. SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 119.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 402(Q)(1)(A)-(B)(ii) (1970).
121. Id. §§ 426, 1395(c) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
122. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS, supra note 113, at 74.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 74-75.
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Clearly, no countervailing considerations of plan costs or injury to
plans may serve to justify the Zinger decision. Additionally, even if one
accepted the implication of this decision that mandatory retirement on an
adequate pension is lawful, such a construction offers little in the way of
guidelines for future adjudication of ADEA cases. Certainly courts should
not adjudicate on a case-by-case basis whether a pension is adequate enough
to escape classification as a subterfuge.
Despite the ADEA, the employment difficulties of older workers con-
tinue to be serious. The Department of Labor has found that the "highest
incidence of ADEA violations occur [for workers] between the ages of 55
and 65. -125 Only if section 623(f)(2) is narrowly construed can the ADEA
protect those workers whose discriminatory terminations are otherwise jus-
tified as being pursuant to bona fide retirement plans. A broad construction
creates "a large loophole in the Act's protection."'
126
As the median age of the population rises, the harmful effects of age
discrimination multiply. These effects pertain to more than the suffering
endured by workers denied the opportunity to continue useful and prod-
uctive employment; they pertain also to those dependent on those workers
for sustenance. 127 They pertain further to economic waste. Premature retire-
ment denies society useful goods and services, reduces our national product,
and produces smaller revenues for the social security system.
128
These policies may appropriately be considered when analyzing the
McMann issue. "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit ....
That principle has particular application in the construction of labor legisla-
tion. - 129 The McMann resolution of the issue is within the spirit of the
ADEA. The Zinger conclusion is not.
CONCLUSION
The McMann decision, on balance, remains more convincing and solid
than Zinger. It is in harmony with the explicitly stated purpose of the
ADEA, with the Congressional findings and legislative history, with the
prohibition against discriminatory discharge, with the last clause of section
125. Hearing on H.R. 2588 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1976) (statement of Ronald J. James, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 31 (statement of Sen. Randolph).
128. See Bixby, Retirement Patterns in the United States: Research and Policy Interaction,
Soc. SEC. BULL. 3, 7 (Aug. 1976); 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 31 (statement of Sen.
Randolph).
129. Woodwork Mfrs. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967).
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623(f)(2), with proper statutory construction, and with ADEA policy. No
one reading the legislative history of the ADEA can fail to perceive the
genuine concern of Congress with the injurious effects of age discrimination
on many thousands of American workers and their families. "[Tihe princi-
pal thrust of the Age Act is to protect the older worker from victimization by
arbitrary classification on account of age .... .. 30 Compulsory retirement
of qualified workers before age sixty-five solely because of the terms of a
retirement plan would seem to be such an arbitrary classification and
victimization.
In construing the section 623(f)(2) exemption, it is at first difficult to
separate the requirements that a plan be both bona fide and not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of the Act. However, as one district court stated, the
"plain reading" of the subterfuge provision leads one to conclude that
regardless of how 'genuine' or 'authentic'. . . a plan might be on
its face or in its inception, if the employer retires an employee (in
effect terminating the employee for age considerations) pursuant
to a retirement plan, then, in effect, the plan is being used to
accomplish an act of age discriminaton. Thus, the retirement...
is a 'subterfuge'....
Such a construal in no way renders the exemption meaningless or
illusory. Rather, it makes the exemption limited and narrow in scope, in
accordance with legislative history, and as it should be in this remedial
statute. If one looks at the plain language of the House and Senate Re-
ports, 132 the purpose of the exemption is to permit the employment of older
workers without necessarily including them in employee benefit plans and
thus, to facilitate the hiring of older workers. This narrow scope and purpose
is affirmed, too, by the explanations of Senators Javits and Yarborough
during the Senate floor debates' 33 and by the comment of Representative
Daniels during the House debates.' 34 Furthermore the finding of the
McMann court is not inconsistent with the secondary purposes that Con-
gress intended the exemption to have, i.e., to prevent the disruption of
fringe benefit schemes which often differentiate on the basis of age in
covering older and younger workers and, consequently, to protect employ-
ers from the economic hardship of rectifying such actuarily-based differ-
entiations.
The ADEA was enacted to rectify a serious social problem. It was
directed at the consequences of unfair employment practices. Age discrimi-
130. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312-13 n.4 (6th Cir. 1975).
131. Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330, 332 (D. Hawaii 1976) (citation
omitted).
132. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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nation, except where bona fide occupational qualifications exist, is contrary
to the humane, economic and social objectives of our society. 135 On bal-
ance, the ADEA's legislative history, accepted canons of construction
concerning remedial statutes and exemptions to such statutes, and policy
considerations all serve to render the McMann decision more persuasive
than that of Zinger. Age discrimination in employment is a continuing
problem. Only a narrow construction of the section 623(f)(2) exemption will
provide older workers with the protection against age-based, unmerited,
involuntary termination that Congress intended them to have.
135. See, e.g., Armour Agricultural Chem. Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 4386, 47 Lab.
Arb. 513, 518 (1966) (Larkin, Arb.).
